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I. Introduction
This article is divided into three main sections. The first section deals with gen-
eral background that surrounded the financial crisis in Ecuador in 1999. The second
section concentrates on specific characteristics that weaken state capability to deal with
This article was presented on July 1, 2000 as an essay for purposes of approval of the L.L.M.
(Master in Laws) at the Center of Commercial Law Studies (CCLS) in Queen Mary and
Westfield College, University of London, London, United Kingdom under the supervision of
Dr. Rosa Lastra. Although the author acts as an official of Central Bank of Ecuador in Quito,
Ecuador, the opinions expressed in it are strictly personal.
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a financial crisis. The third focuses on specific legal and institutional arrangements that
underpinned the financial regulatory and supervisory bodies and governmental inter-
vention.' The crisis background provides a good context to discuss ongoing concerns
regarding good governance in an emergent country and its efficient regulation and super-
vision of its financial system.
A. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Ecuador's recent history is characterized by political, economical, and social distress.
It comprises several presidential replacements (four since February 1997), significant
economic mismanagement, El Niio damage to key export sectors, and a banking system
collapse in 1999. Until 1999, Ecuador had not faced a generalized banking crisis since the
early twentieth century. The more significant recent case of bank failure was overcome
by the seizure of Banco Continental (Continental) by Central Bank of Ecuador (CBE)
in 1996, albeit through a controversial subordinated loan. To improve limited existent
mechanisms to manage a systemic crisis, a controversial law passed in the Congress in
December 1998 created the Deposits Guarantee Agency (DGA) and established an unlim-
ited deposits state guarantee. Although Mahuad, President during 1999, also expressed
interest in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement, this was not achieved on
time. The major obstacles were political objections to reform and mismanagement of
the emerging banking crisis.
The Mahuad government was short-lived. After an obscure intervention in Banco
del Progreso (Progreso) in March 1999-a one-year freeze on most bank deposits in an
attempt to save the banks and huge national currency depreciation-general discontent
and dissatisfaction grew. This exacerbated macroeconomic instability and threatened to
trigger hyperinflation in a country victim to inertial inflation reaching the highest levels
in Latin America. Since 1998, fourteen banks-accounting for about 65 percent of the
system's assets2--had to be seized by the State. This was done via the controversial DGA.
In September 1999, Ecuador became the first country to default the Brady deal that
restructured recently around U.S. $6 billion of public commercial debt.
As an extreme and desperate measure to control inflation and regain exchange sta-
bility, in January 2000, Mahuad announced a Dollarization program (Dollarization),
which introduced the dollar as legal tender for the country. This was the basis of an
economic program targeted to stabilize the out-of-control exchange rate and obtain the
IMF's support that the country needed desperately.
Before this was implemented, a military coup took place on January 21, 2000, forc-
ing the presidential succession by Vice-President Noboa, who immediately announced
the continuation of the Dollarization program. In March 2000, the Congress approved
what is known as the Trolebus Law, including the Dollarization scheme among other
important economic reforms.3
1. The legal framework analyzed for this purpose was that applicable in Ecuador as of July 1,
2000.
2. See IMF Representative Statement, The Ecuadorian Recovery Program (May 16, 2000).
3. See Ley No. 4 para ]a Tranformacion Economica del Ecuador," R.O. Sup 34, (2000), (Ecuador),
available at http://www.lahora.com.ec/paginas/ R.O.03.Sup I3.htm.
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The effects of this economic and political crisis have been catastrophic. After already
poor results during most of the last two decades,4 real GDP growth for 1999 was a
negative 7.3 percent. In June 2000, inflation reached a record 100.3 percent. 5 Private
sector credit was reduced by 25 percent in 1999, with an additional 5 percent decrease
expected in 2000.6 Non-performing loans averaged about 42 percent of the total loan
portfolio and external credit lines have dropped by more than a half to U.S. $0.8 billion.
The estimated fiscal cost of the banking crisis appears to be about U.S. $2.7 billion, 24
percent of GDP in 2000.
7
B. ECUADOR AND DEVELOPMENT MODELS I AND II
This work will distinguish two trends of economic development. The first, called
Development Model I, refers to what, since the late 1940s, the Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean has called the "developmental model:' The second,
Development Model II, is related to the "Washington Consensus" recommendations
from the late 1980s.' The last two decades have seen the spread and generalization
of Model II for Emerging Economies, focused originally and principally in economic
policies. It is implemented in these emerging economies with aid and funding subject to
the conditionality of structural adjustment programs first applied after the 1980s debt
crisis.
Development Models I and II are characterized theoretically by opposite princi-
ples. In the first, the major elements are a state-planned and public-ordered economy
that relies on extended public enterprises, pervasive economic regulation, and closed
economies with import substitution and industrial protection measures. Development
Model II, in contrast, relies on a market-driven and private-ordered economy. It requires
privatization of public enterprises and the actual deregulation and liberalization of the
economy.9
Development Model II relies on market instruments. The market participants need
transparent and explicit rules of the game, expressed in different kinds of legal norms and
also through customary practices and proper information disclosure. An efficient dispute
resolution system is also necessary, not only, but principally, through the judiciary. This
creates the stability needed by this system and generates fair and certain precedent. It
is precisely this rule of the law that permits generalized confidence in such a market
system.
4. From 1990-1998, the GDP was 0.7. See PNUD, Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano Ecuador
(1999), available at http://www.pnud.org.ec.
5. Data published in newspapers on July 1, 2000.
6. See Goldman Sachs, Latin America Economic Analyst, March 17, 2000.
7. See supra note 2.
8. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: a Changing Role for
Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L LAW 875 (1999).
9. See Id.; see also Kevin Davis, Michael J. Trebilcock, What Role Do Legal Institutions Play
in Development? Presentation at the IMF's Conference on Second Generation Reforms,
Washington (Nov. 8-9, 1999), available at http.//www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/
reforms.
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Many emerging economies are attempting to move from Model I to Model II. This
move, however, affects the role of the law in the relationships between individuals and,
especially, between individuals and the State. Legislation in Model I was used to weaken
the institutions of private property and to endow the State with increased power. Relevant
public law (public enterprise laws, foreign investment and currency control regulation,
nationalization decrees, price, and financial regulation) were usually extensive, overlap-
ping, and often contradictory, and thus, did not promote a transparent legal system. On
the other hand, in Development Model II, the focus is on the private and proper frame-
work for market-driven policies. Primary is a well-defined, inalienable private property
rights system and a formal system of contract law. Corporate law and tax regimes are
means to attract capital investment. Finally, this Model requires insolvency regimes and
bankruptcy rules as part of the framework."
Ecuador has, since the early 1980s, been trying actively to adopt Development
Model II. It has struggled to implement the stabilization and structural adjustment
programs, however, according to its own timetable and specific economic, social, and
political characteristics.
C. DEREGULATION IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN ECUADOR
The transition from Model I to Model II involves the deregulation of the differ-
ent economic sectors. Deregulation is the mechanism used by the state to retreat from
former practices of intervention in private relationships, and from over-regulating trans-
actions that should be controlled by market forces under Development Model II prin-
ciples. Economic deregulation, however, does not mean the absence of law. Rather, a
legal framework for transparent and efficient market transactions is important. This is
particularly true for emerging economies where underdeveloped markets are generalized,
monopolies and oligopolies concentrate resources and information, and inequalities of
wva~t' ':s1:t11LUL1 do0 not dIJUVY extensive pd1 LlcipdIA311 110111 11eW dtLJS.
The IMF and other multilateral organizations have used conditions precedent to
the disbursement of funds to encourage emerging economies to adopt such deregulation
programs. Ecuador is no exception. Many of the major elements considered part of the
deregulation process in the financial system have been required of Ecuador, including
expanded and deepened financial intermediation activities and the development of capi-
tal markets. This was to be accomplished by (a) fostering a more efficient and competitive
financial system, (b) establishing adequate prudential oversight of financial institutions,
(c) encouraging the emergence of new mechanisms to attract medium and long-term
savings, as well as developing the infrastructure and financial instruments needed to
channel these savings toward private sector investment, and (d) expanding access to
financial services, especially for small-scale savers and borrowers. These reform princi-
ples were introduced with the enactment of the new Monetary Law in May 1992,11 the
10. See Davis & Trebilcock supra note 9.
11. See Ley de Regimen Monetario y Banco del Estado, (1992, Ecuador, Monetary-Law), available
at www.bvg.fin.ec/instante/maniana/julio2000/julio 13/default.htm.
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Banking Law in June 1994,12 and the country's first Securities Law in 1993.13 The bank
supervisor and regulator, Superintendence of Banks (SB), lost many of its discretionary
powers. 4 There were no major changes in the insurance and pension funds fields.
Monetary and banking reforms reduced direct government control over basic bank-
ing practices, such as the setting of interest rates and the allocation of credit. Central
Bank of Ecuador (CBE) discontinued direct allocation of credit. This task was mainly
assumed by the financial system. Addressing credit allocation, former Governor De la
Torre noted the following: "The central bank is not qualified ... to assess the viability,
efficiency and yield of thousands of investment projects. This task should be assumed by
the financial system, including the banks and the capital markets ... "s Since January
1993, the Monetary Board fully liberalized interest rates.' 6 Permits for operations and
transactions of banks were widened. 7 Also, early in the 1990s, CBE introduced market
instruments as its main tool for controlling prices. This kept the banking system as the
major participant for monetary purposes, thus avoiding retail operations. These devel-
opments show that Ecuador has proceeded significantly with banking deregulation in a
short period of time.
The securities market reform was especially important. For the first time, Ecuadorian
law addressed its shallow market." Regulatory responsibility was allocated into a separate
entity, the Superintendence of Companies/National Securities Council.
This process has not been a smooth one. The first stage of deregulation was very
aggressive, resulting in many arguments and concerns about the impact of deregula-
tion.'9 The state intervention in the financial system under Model I had been responsible
for low volumes of saving and capital accumulation, and for stimulating inefficient and
unprofitable allocation of investments. This had a corresponding effect on the possi-
bilities for expanding productive capacity.2 Indeed, since many believed government
intervention created uncompetitive banking sectors in many developing and transition
countries,2 ' financial deregulation was emphasized as a means to correct deviations in
12. See Ley General de Instituciones del Sistema Financiero, (1994, Ecuador, Banking-Law), avail-
able at www.superban.gov.ec/ley-gen-instsf.htm.
13. See Ley de Mercado de Valores, (1993, Ecuador, Securities-Law) available at www.covpei.org/
ingles/legislation/46.htm.
14. About intervention disappearance, see infra Section III.
15. A De la Tome, El Banco Central y el Credito al Sector Productivo: Analisis de una Propuesta
Peligrosa e Incongruente, REVISTA CASH CONTINENTAL, Sept. 1999.
16. Reinserted in March 2000.
17. See e.g., Banking Law, supra note 12, at art. 51.
18. For an updated and complete analysis on Securities Markets in Ecuador, see Sandra Pazmino,
Banco Central de Ecuador, El Rol del Mercado de Valores en el Ahorro Interno (Mar. 2000),
available at http://www.bce.fin.ec/publicaciones/apuntes/ apuntes.html.
19. However, at the same time of the introduction of the deregulation process in the struc-
tural adjustment programs, there was already broad discussion about grounds and possible
effects of the deregulation process. See e.g., ADRAIN HAMILTON, THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION,
Chs. 9-10 (1986). B.
20. See R. Zahler, Financial Strategies in Latin America: The Southern Cone Experience. In
THE LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT DEBATE: NEOSTRUCTURALISM, NEOMONETARISM, AND
ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES 102 (P. Meller ed., 1991).
21. See Malcolm Knight, Developing and Transition Countries Confront Financial Globalization
(June 1999), available at http://www.imf.orglexternal/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/06/knight.htm.
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the financial markets and to increase the competition of the banking system. These were
the elements upon which the initial legal reform efforts concentrated.
Notwithstanding the general reform process, the recurrence of banking crisis in
emergent economies during the last decade is not uncommon, and has been analyzed
by scholars around the world, especially in Venezuela and South Asian countries. 22 How
effectively banks perform their specific functions depends, in turn, on competition in
the banking system and the general state of the macroeconomy. Referring specifically to
Ecuador, there were also macroeconomic conditions that have to be taken into account
in relation to the crisis. However, this cannot ignore that the "structural weakness of
Ecuador's banking sector was exposed by the sharp deterioration of economic conditions
in 1998 .. "23 As noticed by many analysts, a major reason for Ecuador's current distress
is also its weak banks..
24
Some common conclusions and recommendations are of particular interest when
studying the banking crisis in Ecuador, particularly those related to the weak regulatory
and supervisory institutions existent in the affected countries and problems regarding
credit allocation. Moreover, at the time of the reform, all "countries tried to improve
prudential regulation and supervision, but progress in these areas was, in all cases, slower
than expected and weaker than needed to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial
system. '"2' There have been also incompatibilities of the model in the context of improper
institutional framework and weaknesses in the political and economic structure of many
emergent economies. As Lal and Mynt stated: "The economic forces in the form of
the world market demand, capital accumulation, population growth, and technological
changes would operate on our underdeveloped economy through the filter of its initial
institutional conditions'
26
Some of these generalized concerns over the financial crisis have been faced by the
official sector at a time of new financial architecture discussion. In this context appears
what has been called the necessity of a Second Generation Reform, 27 which would include
22. see e.g., Ruth de Krivoy, The Venezuelan Banking Crisis 1994-1995. In BANK FAILURES AND
BANK INSOLVENCY LAW IN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION, (Rosa M. Lastra & Henry N. Schiff-
man eds., 1999); Ross Cranston, Credity, Security and Debt Recovery: Law's Role in Reform in
Asia and the Pacific, 39 ST. Louis U. L. 1. 759 (1995); Timothy Lane et al., IMF-Supported
Programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment (1999) available at
http:www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/op178/; Michael S. Bennett, Banking Deregulation in
Indonesia: An Updated Perspective in Light of the Asian Financial Crisis, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L 1 (1999); ECN 1997 "Banking in Emerging Markets Survey," April 12.
23. J.P. Morgan, Ecuador, IMF Facility Alone May Not Avoid Insolvency in the Medium Terl,
MARKET BRIEF (July 28, 1999).
24. See ECN 99 Mar 20, "Down but not out: Latin America's ills require several cures. For some
countries, one may be to adopt the dollar." (761)
25. Verente Galbis, Financial Sector Reforms in Eight Countries: Issues and Results, WP/95/141-EA
available at http:/www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=1856.0. This report specifi-
cally includes Ecuador.
26. Deepak Lal & H. Myint, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY, EQUITY, AND GROWTH:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 190 (1996).
27. The term has been adopted from the "Conference on Second Generation Reforms" held by the
IMF Institute in Washington, DC, on November 8-9, 1999. See http./www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/.
Fall 2001 595
some of the old, but also many innovative elements, especially those related to a deep
institutional and legal framework reform. They are: (a) strengthening governance and
the quality of government institutions as an essential prerequisite for the continuation
of stability in terms of the macroeconomic and growth policies and strengthening the
capacity of Government themselves; (b) enhancing the legal and judiciary systems, since
it is difficult to get protection for the poor on an equitable basis without it; (c) overturn-
ing the question of financial supervision and control through an appropriate framework
in terms of bank supervision, supervision of capital markets, integrity, consistency, and
transparency; (d) fighting corruption, as it is something that pervades each of these
former areas, there by creating the environment for a virtuous economic circle; and
(e) reforming the social framework in a way that deals with people who fall out of the
loop. 28
II. The Weakness of the State and the Rule of Law
Major reform, as previously described, occurred especially in the financial sector.
This affected public and private participants in different ways. Multilateral organizations
have recognized that these reforms have greatly reoriented the state's role in Latin Amer-
ican and the Caribbean economies and are transforming governance in the region.29 As
crises of earlier periods are important in explaining the economic and political rela-
tionships that emerged and characterized the next several decades, so responses to this
new era of crisis are the basis on which state-economy and state-society relations in
many countries will be constructed for the next several decades. Thus, it is important
to understand the complex social and political components of the crisis, the quality of
governments, and the causes for Ecuador's ineffective implementation of the reform. It
should be noted that government, for these purposes, should be understood as State, in
the legal sense.
For reform to work, each country must design and implement its own reform con-
sidering its political, economic, and social context. It must also implement the reform at
its own pace. The new Ecuadorian banking law, however, was modeled on Chilean law.
This was a law introduced at the final stages of Chile's deep banking crisis; a crisis that
required massive use of public resources. Thus, the Chilean law focused on the preven-
tion of crisis and deterrence of public intervention (with public resources). De la Torre
noted that, for reform to be effective in Ecuador, it was necessary to rely on some macro-
and microeconomic conditions that have not characterized the Ecuadorian environment.
In between macro conditions, it was desirable to have not only disciplined monetary
and fiscal management, but also protection against exogenous shocks to decrease the
28. Extracted from James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank Group, Keynote Address
at the Conference on Second Generation Reforms, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8, 1999) available
at http:/www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/jdwsp I 10899.htm.
29. See Enrique V. Iglesias, President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Latin
America and the Caribbean in the Face of Globalization: Progress to Date and the Road Ahead,
presentation at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD X),
Bangkok, Thail., Feb. 14, 2000, available at http://ww.iadb.org/exr/speeches/sl4Il00e.htm.
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general vulnerability of the banking system. As for micro conditions, first-class supervi-
sion and regulation and a transparent disclosure of information was indispensable. He
also deemed necessary the existence of a basic institutional framework comprised by an
efficient, independent, and trustworthy judiciary to impede the offense of banking laws
and frauds) ° It is clear that these conditions are absent in Ecuador. They lead to another
field of interest: the capabilities of any State to apply such reform and to what extent
the arisen weakness is merely the cost of implementing other core elements of the same
structural adjustment-the relaxing of state regulation.
The Ecuadorian financial reform process may be perceived as having been imposed
from abroad. It was related closely to the conditionality of the multilateral financial
institutions (IMF, World Bank, IBD, etc.) established in the arrangements and loan
agreements executed by Ecuador during the last decade. This conditionality was applied
widely in this context, not only in Ecuador.3 These institutions, however, are actually
interested in the problems that confront the reform processes and have identified two
major areas of concern: (a) an inadequate institutional framework, and (b) the absence
of a domestic ownership of reform (in a wider sense).
Usually, the reasons given for this ineffective institutional framework relate to admin-
istrative constraints and corruption. The term weakness is preferred to corruption, since
it broadens the scope of the analysis, not confining it to the public sector, nor to indi-
vidual behaviors. Let us assume that the weakness of the state, defined as the inability
to implement its policy choices, creates the conditions for the failure of the institutional
framework. Here, the problems that confront the public regulatory and supervisory bod-
ies could be interpreted as a lack of institutional, political, technical, and administrative
capability to perform effectively and efficiently their duties.
There is a renewed interest in state capacity and the relationship between the state
and economy. During the last few months, the official sector referred to recent efforts
to overcome poor results of the prior process as second generation reform. It has been
noted that "second generation issues focus around the questions of the structure of
the right- inst'it,,C'onS , ^4 d ;r---,oront F tko Amr~nl ctritf;vp lpol nnl rPayjl~itnrv
functions of the state, addressing the incentives and actions that are required to have
private sector development, and to develop the institutional capacity for reforms.
32
These second generation reforms include financial, judicial, and public sector reform.
This has encouraged scholars to pay greater attention to institutional structures and
the way that such institutions affect the course of economic development.
While the private sector correctly assumes a leadership role in the economy, it needs the
support of strong state institutions, the rule of law, effective public and private market insti-
tutions as well as active political participation of civil society in democratic processes. Good
governance is now recognized as a necessary and sometimes missing ingredient in the reform
process ....33
30. See De la Torre, A. (1997) "El Manejo de Crisis Bancarias: el Marco Legal Ecuatoriano
y Posibles Reformas," "Corporation de Estudios para el Desarrollo" CORDES.
31. See V. Corbo, & S. Fischer, Adjustment Programs and World Bank Support: Rationale and
Main Results. In DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND POLICY REFORM: ESSAY IN THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONDITIONALITY IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (P. Mosley ed. 1992).
32. Wolfensohn, supra note 28 (emphasis added).
33. De la Terre, supra note 30.
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There is likely general agreement that the policy choices and implementation of the
reform reside not only in its design, but also in the state's ability to enforce it. Thus, how
crises are played out in individual countries depends, in large part, on the strength and
durability of existing institutions for conflict resolution, the skills and orientations of
political leaders, using the expanded space available to them to define new strategies for
economic development, and to build new and durable coalitions of political support.34
The first condition could be described as responsiveness; the second as legitimacy. But
both of these conditions have to be applied in an appropriate framework that ensures
transparent accountability.
A. OWNERSHIP OF THE REFORM
The problem of ownership of the reform may be manifest in two main areas:
(a) inadequate adaptation of the legal systems to the requirements of the reform, and (b)
insufficient legitimacy of the objectives of the process with an ensuing lack of sociopo-
litical consensus.
In Ecuador, the adoption of model financial legislation, which does not necessar-
ily reflect the nation's own legal traditions, has not been accompanied by a relevant
commercial law reform. This has retained major Napoleonic civil-code traditions with
characteristically complicated mechanisms to create security interests, and especially, to
transfer them proper assignments duly notified to debtors. There also remains excessive
taxation for transferring assets, which considerably affects the efficiency of the financial
system as a whole with regard to transparency of information and accurate determination
of creditworthiness; 35 accompanied by the overcharging of debtors with non-transparent
commissions added to active interest rates. Practical solutions to these legal problems
only added, therefore, to the lack of transparency of the financial operations.
36
In contrast, English law (and in some cases, Anglo-Saxon law) provides a broader
spectrum and greater flexibility for these matters. Some examples are: universal corpo-
rate floating charges, informal security over investment securities without registration of
the pledgee in the books of the issuer, corporate non-possessory chattel mortgages, and
self-help enforcement by possessory management through a receiver and private sale, as
opposed to a judicially-ordered public action. Rights of substitution, e.g., for collateral-
ized investment securities, in English jurisdictions do not destroy the charge, but may
demote it to a floating charge. In Franco-Latin countries, this dominion by the pledgor
may destroy the security interest altogether.
37
The accelerated pace of financial innovation also has forced bankers and practi-
tioners to adopt "innovative" legal instruments to overcome gaps, without analyzing
the general implications for the legal system. An important example is the use of the
commercial Anglo-Saxon Trust, introduced together with the securities law, which has
become rapidly and broadly popular as it provides a more flexible range of securities,
34. See MERILEE S. GRINDLE CHALLENGING THE STATE: CRISIS AND INNOVATION IN LATIN AMER-
ICA AND AFRICA 45-46 (1996).
35. Assets remain undervalued for this reason.
36. E.g., undervaluation or extensive use of "trusts."
37. PHILIP R. Wood, Financial Legal Instruments. In COMPARATIVE FINANCIAL LAW, 62 (Sweet &
Maxwell ed., 1995) (absent in Ecuador, assessed as traditional France-Latin jurisdiction).
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transfers, securitisation of assets, and avoids the generally inefficient requirement of judi-
cial enforcement. 38 However, this has brought new conflicts related to its enforcement, as
judges were not prepared appropriately to accept legal innovation on financial matters,
thus increasing legal uncertainty and credit risk. From the point of view of supervisors,
legal innovation has also brought new challenges, as the regulatory framework has not
been able to comprise all these new legal institutions and forms.
Legal systems (the rules of the game) have to be carefully established, as they are
supposed to last for a long period of time. Wood suggests that it is true that some
legal systems do undergo great creative shifts and then "settle down to stability, minor
adjustments, occasional tinkering, the filling out of the detail:' He considers also that
"[s]table change has its advantages: the law is a known quantity and is predictable, it
does not overreact to an episode or to a transient political philosophy or to some fad or
fashion of the day. There is time for reflection, for a historical consensus to be reached.
39
(emphasis added). It is precisely the latter that accentuates the requirement of reform
"ownership" as a main quality for its ultimate success.
The reform has been blamed permanently as a major cause of fragility of Ecuador's
financial system and the abuses of the bankers.4 ° However, for others, "Ecuador is in
the process of a meltdown-not because it is fighting a war, but because it has avoided
reform"'" or lacked adequate reform4 2 or even, because deregulation has been reversed.
4 3
But it is not possible to blame the reform itself, nor the lack of it as the main cause of
the crisis. First, there are other economic, political and social conditions that affected
its implementation. Secondly, it is impossible to have successful economic results by
just transplanting the liberalization "recipe" from one country to another to pursue
macroeconomic positive results. Lastly, reform requires a proper institutional framework
in order to be implemented successfully.
B. THE CAPABILITY OF THE STATE AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE REFORM
The importance of ensuring efficient governance for implementing economic reform
seems to be related directly to the spread of the social beneficial effects of the whole lib-
eralization process, not only in the specific countries, but also in the globalized world.44
Good governance is related to the roots of conformation of the States and the type of
them. The social contract underlying such State conformation has been provided to soci-
eties, theoretically, as a means to achieve a general public welfare not attainable outside
38. Trusts in other European France-Latin jurisdictions are still a matter of analysis, whereas in
Latin America they are already common.
39. Wood, supra note 37, at 55.
40. See generally, Alberto Acosta & I. Schuldt, La hora de la Reactivation, ESPOL (1999);
Guayaquil & R. Vallejo, Maridaje de la Politica y del Dinero, EL COMERCIO, Oct. 23, 1999.
41. Stephen Johnson, Ecuador's Problems Not Just 'Bum Luck" N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2000.
42. Deconstructing Latin Ills: Not All of the Region is in as Bad a Mess at it Seems, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 4, (1999).
43. A. Pachano, Regular. No Imponer, EL COMERCIO, Nov. 26, 1999.
44. The IMF Institute Conference (supra 28) has produced many interesting papers related to
this field. See Wolfensohm, supra note 28.
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such a form of organization. Thus, good governance is expected to fulfill this objective,
regardless of its political orientation.
The communist and the market-oriented State concepts began to be discussed just
at the end of nineteenth century, but the core objective of State conformation has never
completely differed from the original. The lack of state capability might also be a cause
for failure in the development process itself. However, measuring state capability to meet
this objective is difficult. A capable state is one that exhibits the ability to establish and
maintain effective functions in four main fields: institutional, political, technical, and
administrative.
45
When measuring the rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness,
and quality of the regulatory environment provided by the States, Latin America ranked
behind Asia and far behind the most developed countries. Opinion polls show that Latin
Americans are dissatisfied with the quality of their governments and think corruption
is getting worse. IDB has also noted that inequality in Latin America is the most pro-
nounced of any region in the world, and by most indications, getting worse. "In Latin
America, the top twenty percent of the population earns twelve times what the bottom
twenty percent make."46 Often, economic stagnation or decline went hand in hand with
widespread questioning of regimes in power and a generalized delegitimization of the
state, as an agent of economic growth.47
Ecuador is immersed in a general concern about the region. It has also engaged,
during the last few decades, in muddling towards an economic stabilization program
and a structural reform process. Continually painful economic measures, together with
constant reductions in public money spent on social services and welfare in order to
control public deficits, have increased wealth distribution inequalities instead of bring-
ing an improvement in social welfare.48 Deep frustration and dissatisfaction are natural
responses to an exhausting program of reform without improvement in social and eco-
nomic standards. All of this suggests that there is decreased authority and legitimacy
of governments to set authoritative standards for individual and group behavior, or
increased challenges to the state's policy choices, especially in the economic field.49
There are two main models of State: autonomous and factional.5" A regime or
government having objectives of its own determines the autonomous state. The factional
state, on the other hand, serves the economic self-interests of the coalition of pressure
groups that succeed in capturing it. Ecuador easily could be assessed as a factional state,
in which not only powerful economic groups have addressed the policy choices, but also
other interest groups (like the public syndicates and, now, the indigenous movement)
45. State capability concepts are extracted from Grindle. See supra note 34, at Ch. 1 and 2.
46. De la Torre, supra note 30.
47. Grindle, supra note 34, at 2.
48. PROGRAM OF THE NATIONS UNITED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT ECUADOR (1999). Chapter 3 encompasses an analysis about poverty and social devel-
opment in Ecuador during the 1980s and 1990s.
49. This also offers one explanation for the political instability during 1999, and especially for
the military coup in January 2000 in Ecuador, with active participation of the indigenous
and other social movements.
50. For heoretical support for state-models see DEEPAK LAL et al., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
POVERTY, EQUITY AND GROWTH, 260-273 (1996).
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that have been allowed to share pieces of it. This is despite ongoing allegations by some
coastal sectors, during the periodic regional confrontation, about the maintenance of a
centralist model that serves only the capital public officials interests. 1
Instead of implementing calculated and centered policies with a long-term public
welfare vision, the government, during the last two decades, has been forced to shift
decisions rapidly and readdress economic programs and policy choices to contain and
keep political support and avoid social confrontation.12 With particular reference to
the Ecuadorian financial banking crisis, there is the perception by many national and
international analysts that a commitment from the former government to the banking
sector exists, in order to manage the financial crisis in 1999, without putting overall
public welfare over particular economic interests.
5 3
A factional state could also be considered as a corruption driven state. This is because
of the clandestine and undue influence of the economic power over the political power.
Structural corruption characterizes factional-states.
Critics of Development Model I concentrated on the ways in which public action
can distort markets and create disincentives for productive investment and behavior, as is
the case with financial repression. This supported financial liberalization and conformed
major grounds for what could be called the minimalist-state role. As a result, the natu-
rally weak institutional framework prevailing in a developing country could have been
affected directly and adversely not only because of quantitative reduction, but mainly by
a qualitative weakening and even some reversion of state powers. Indeed, deregulation
could have been underpinned by a wrongful perception of all developing countries being
conformed as autonomous predatory states 4 and might not have taken into account the
existence of factional states, like Ecuador.
Institutional capacity, or legitimacy, is described as an ability to assert the primacy of
national policies over those of other groupings. This is difficult to obtain in a factional-
state. Often, economic stagnation or decline went hand in hand with widespread ques-
tioning of regimes in power and generalized de-legitimization of the state as an agent of
economic growth. 5 In Ecuador, continually painful economic measures, together with
constant reductions in public money spent on social services and welfare in order to
control public deficits, have increased wealth distribution inequalities instead of bringing
an improvement in social welfare and economic standards. 6 This suggests that there
is decreased authority and legitimacy of governments to set authoritative standards for
51. Indeed an autonomous-depredatory state characteristic, which involves self seeking extraction
of the maximum continuing flow of resources for the members of the government and its
associates. Id.
52. E.g., several recent drawbacks in gas-price increase.
53. See generally, Chaos, Continued: Ecuador, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1999; Jamil's jam, THE
ECONOMIST June 19, 1999. See several editorials in Ecuadorian main newspapers from late
1999, e.g., by Andres Vallejo; Leon Roldos; Alberto Acosta; Raul Vallejo; Washington Herrera;
Rene Mauge; Oswaldo Hurtado; and Simon Espinosa.
54. E.g., Mexico was controlled during almost the entire century by only one political party.
55. Grindle, supra note 34, at 2.
56. See e.g., PROGRAM OF THE NATIONS UNITED FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 48, at Ch. 3.
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individual and group behavior, or increased challenges to the state's policy choices, espe-
cially in the economic field. 7
Political capacity is considered to be an effective and legitimate channel for societal
demand-making and representation. Unable to claim broad-based legitimacy due to the
poor results of the reform, or the loyalty of traditional support groups, political regimes
demonstrated their inability to dominate and lead civic society as they had done in the
past. Government responses to the crisis in Ecuador, such as decreased spending during
most of 1999, and especially the freezing of bank deposits, have been undone by popular
anger. Moreover, political parties have not given proper support for concrete actions of
state leaders and hinder their effectiveness. Indeed, political parties are also distrusted
because of the faction-driven perceptions about them.
Most of these demands will be reflected through the production of law. The absence
of this political capability also turns into a conflictive, and even contradictory legal sys-
tem. The law exists in layers of conflicting legislation, reflecting very different conditions
and political outlooks and interests of the groups that backed the political representatives
in the Congress. It is very difficult for a State to put in place the necessary regulatory
and supervisory infrastructure under such conditions. In the end, this disarrayed legal
system could also be a cause for the financial crisis in Ecuador, due to the lack of proper
instruments and tools for opportune state-intervention.
Technical capacity encompasses the ability to set and manage effective macroeco-
nomic policies, through appropriately placed units for policy analysis, and an important
role for technical input and information in decision-making. This is important to policy-
makers who will have to design and introduce the reform, and technocrats, who will
implement and in some cases even administratively enforce it. Technocrats also take care
of the "institutional memory" that ensures implementation of long-term projects, with-
out any direct link to a specific regime. This does not mean that technocrats eventually
get involved directly in the selection of policy choices; rather, they get involved from a
different and concentrated perspective.
Ecuador show increased numbers, visibility, and the influence of economic and
financial technocrats mainly during the 1990s. This includes increased presence of inter-
national technocrats in national policy-making. During the decade, technical analysis
units became more important in national policy making, often to the detriment of cab-
inets, legislative institutions, party leaders, lobby groups, and traditional ministries such
as interior, public works, and foreign affairs. 8
Grindle also highlighted the surge of an evident tension between technocratic and
participatory policy making.59 In Ecuador, technocrats create a type of "conflict of inter-
est" between officials in the State who promote the factional state, and those who are
concentrated in building such a technical capability for the long-term. Notwithstanding
such technical capability, however, its technocrats have been isolated from major political
decisions with the result that important projects and programs ended, uselessly wasting
scarce economic and human resources.
57. The 2000 military coup in Ecuador has followed the announcement of the Dollarization
process.
58. Grindle, supra 34, at 35-36.
59. Id. at 7-10.
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Moreover, regional confrontation, accentuated during the banking crisis, has also
affected the credibility of these technocrats, as their work has been naturally concentrated
in and identified with one region, the capital. On the other hand, there are also no proper
and accurate channels to feedback design and implementation of technical programs with
societal results. This also hinders obtaining the political and social support fundamental
for a successful implementation of any technical program.
The administrative capacity is the ability to perform basic administrative functions
essential to economic development and social welfare' and will be reviewed extensively
in Section III.
Summing up, States must be capable if they are to be effective in managing tasks
of economic and political development and reform. This is especially true if they are to
face the challenges that a factional state causes, and to avoid a constituents economic
interest group-driven reform. Without proper development and maintenance of such
capacities, the resulting changes in policies, and the introduction of a reformed legal and
institutional framework can result in further exacerbation of the natural weaknesses that
are common characteristics in developing and emerging States.
C. ALLOCATION OF CREDIT IN ECUADOR
To produce the maximum benefit for society, credit funds would need to flow to
projects offering the highest returns for a given level of risk. Resource allocation efficiency
will determine the efficiency of the economy as a whole. 61 Defects in the operation
of repressed financial systems hinder this market allocation of resources. State-driven
allocation of credit policies benefited mainly restricted sectors of the society, with strong
political connections. Post-stabilization financial developments in Latin America did not
imply changes in the oligopoly and segmented characteristics of the financial system that
restrict credit access to smaller enterprises and producers not related to the banks.62 The
impossibility of introducing any effective competition policies is another outstanding
side effect of inefficient allocation of credit with devastating results on the confidence of
the participants in the market.
In Ecuador, government intervention in the banking system was characterized during
the 1970s and the 1980s by prizing boards, such as the interest rate determination by
the Monetary Board, and especially by administrative allocation of credit. In this period,
factional-state has driven allocation of credit mainly to sectors that have supported it,
rather than to those more efficient for the economy as a whole. De la Torre also noted
that there has been a pattern over the management of these resources toward reorienting
these policies with regard to the presently particular circumstances.
During the 1970s, the major bulk of the available resources were governmentally
driven, not necessarily to the more efficient sectors of the economy. After the debt crisis
in the early 1980s, central bank credit became the major source. In the 1990s, specifically
after the major monetary reform that broadly restricted access to central bank resources
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Estabilidad y Estructura: Interacciones en el Crecimiento Economico, CEDES 38-47 (1994).
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and conferred central bank independence,63 the main source of funding for large eco-
nomic groups came from the private banking system.64 Somehow confirming this, Lasso,
the former Ministry of Economy, recently highlighted that Ecuadorian corporations have
had higher availability of credit than other more developed Latin American countries. He
considered decreases in private corporation leverage levels and equity democratization
as a major means to achieve economic reactivation nowadays. 61
While examining bank capital standards in Latin America, there are conclusions
that the region's high levels of concentration of wealth and thin equity markets make it
unlikely that such standards can be enforced effectively. These conditions enable bank
owners to dilute their real capital stake by making loans to themselves, either directly,
or by borrowing from each other.66 Rodrik, in relation to effects of decision-making
market discipline in emerging economies asserts: "What goes under the name 'market
discipline' is not a neutral political force. It empowers financial markets-both domestic
and foreign--over other constituencies in society. Hence it can be seen as serving the
needs of particular social groups at the expense of others."67
Over time, the inefficiencies associated with protection to those who supported the
factional-state will lower the efficiency of the economy.6" De la Torre also observed that
if allocation of credit in Ecuador is a function of the public entity that monopolizes
the issue of money, rather than the role of a professional banking system supported
by market rules, and enhanced by transparent disclosure and efficient supervision, then
there is no real market process, but a political process that will breed clientelism.
69
This could be applied extensively to the issue of state-driven allocation of credit and
the supervisor difficulties to control concentration on connected lending over the limits
permitted by the law.7 ° There is a vicious circle that structural adjustment and financial
liberalization cannot break easily. Rather, as has been explained before, the deregulation
of the banking sector and the fast pace of the implementation of the reform has helped
to increase the natural weaknesses of developing states, building up or accentuating
the incapability to supervise and regulate efficiently. And these conditions, instead of
enlarging market participants on the demand side, have restricted them as a consequence
of increased poverty during the same period. 7
63. Despite that central bank independence was only introduced with the Constitution amend-
ment in 1998, in the practice of independence was significantly increased after the 1992
monetary reform.
64. See De la Terre, supra note 15.
65. G. Lasso, Credito y Reactivacion, DIARIO Hoy, May 30,2000.
66. Lilianan Rojas-Suarez & Steven R. Weisbrod, TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE REGULATORY AND
SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR LATIN AMERICA (1996).
67. D. Rodrik, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: Doss ONE ACHITECTURAL STYLE FIT ALL?
24 (1999) at http://www.globalarchitects.org/00005.pdf.
68. DEEPAK LAL, supra note 51, at. 269-271.
69. De La Torre, supra 15.
70. E.g., Continental, Progreso, Filanbanco, Prestamos.
71. From forty percent in the 1980s to eighty percent in the 1990s, see PROGRAM OF THE NATIONS
UNITED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 48.
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In the end, state-intervention in the banking system has transplanted the costs of
private inefficiencies to the public sector. The banking system overhaul by the DGA
depended exclusively on Ministry of Finance funding. At the time liquidity was unavail-
able, therefore, the resources were provided by the direct discount of public bonds in
the Central Bank or, indirectly, by freezing deposits declared in March 1999 after the
bank holiday. As highlighted by The Economist, "depositors, who see themselves paying
the cost of bankers' mismanagement and the government's reluctance to offend political
allies by closing some banks that are near to collapse' 7 2 Furthermore, depositors have
also paid inefficiency costs of the private sector and high leverage permitted by a banking
system without suitable risk assessment.
One way to overcome this situation is the strengthening of financial regulation,
despite strong political and interested interference. The case of external regulation
depends on circumstances in which the private sector, left to itself, produces market
failure, or at least sub-optimal results. These results are arguably worse than public
sector regulation, even with all the biases and failings that such regulation may entail.73
Without proper regulation in place, interested "pressure" groups will be able to impose
their own "rules" over those that should attend to society's general welfare. Next, finan-
cial reform will be forced to confront this allocation of credit reality and the existence of
this factional state. Indeed, re-regulation should not be confused with further financial
repression, as state-driven policies in a factional-state will not break the vicious circle.
Orientation might rest mainly on proper responsiveness of the State, by enhancing its
capability as a whole, in order to concentrate efforts on general public interest and to
avoid efficiently, such pressures.
Responsiveness also will arise through better assessment over personal, technical,
and moral conditions of owners, managers, and directors of banks. This will have to
be built under public, transparent, and non-discretional general rules to be efficient,
perhaps through a public registry with an opposition process, if necessary. 4 Indeed such
technical and moral assessment should include the renulptnrv And i1nrxvisnrv nffc;al
and personnel.
Without proper regulation, gridlock could be boosted. Gridlock is the moral hazard
that occurs when good firms are induced to behave badly because the firms witness
bad behavior in others, or have no assurance that competitors will behave well.7" The
problem is enhanced in a competitive market where all the participants, in order to make
profits, adopt risky conduct with short-term goals. The major cause for the surge and
persistence of gridlock is the supervisors' inability to enforce regulation. As competitors
cannot be sure about general regulatory compliance, they are encouraged to keep risky
behavior in order to ensure personal profits.
72. Ecuador: Chaos, continued, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 20,1999, at 787.
73. C. Goodhart et al., The Rationale for Regulationin, WHERE, HOW AND WHAT Now? 4-9
(1998).
74. Ongoing bank secrecy rules deter this.
75. Doug Llewellyn, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY OCCASSIONAL PAPER SERIES, Apr.1991.
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D. THE JUDICIARY AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
As a condition for law enforcement, the core of the settlement is comprised of
a well-functioning judicial system, providing efficient, rational outcomes and adequate
remedies. The absence of efficient enforcement mechanisms in a market-driven State
gives rise to legal uncertainty. The extent of judiciary deficiencies and, alternatively,
the practical possibility to remedy them will directly bias the amount and extension of
these costs.
The Ecuadorian judicial sector has suffered from a lack of financial and technical
resources, administrative inefficiencies, and a growing backlog of cases. On the other
hand, strong political intervention has transformed many courts and judges into another
instrument for managing the formerly described factional state. In addition to systemic
bribery, there is also the corruption of personal relations.76 The enforcement of contracts,
the enforcement of laws against rule breakers, and the ability to carry on economic func-
tions without recourse to bribery and subornation become increasingly difficult under
such conditions.77 Remedies can be incomplete and delayed until they are innocuous.78
Therefore, personal punishment is evaded by prescription.
The judiciary is important for the financial system, but the former has generally
resulted in the sector's inability to meet the requirements of the private and public sector.
In the microeconomy, creditors are affected by difficulties in ensuring opportune or
fair payment, and application of proper insolvency mechanisms. Moreover, small, weak
debtors can be affected adversely by the abuses of their creditors. In the macroeconomy,
enforcement of law and regulation in the financial system has been extremely poor.
Most, if not all, cases filed during the 1980s by the banking supervisor against financial
institutions have been decided for the financial institutions, resulting in damages and
compensation being covered by the State and personal risks for public officials.79 The
absence of trustworthy judicial review results in hidden costs for the financial system
that can be classified in two types: first, purely economic costs that, due to uncertainty,
are difficult to calculate. The second type is probably more important but less evident:
the moral hazard costs.
Economic costs can be: (a) direct, such as bribery, or even the necessity to access
more costly alternative disputes resolution mechanisms, for instance, arbitration or sub-
mission to foreign courts, when possible or, (b) indirect, mainly the legal risk taken into
account to assess credit risk, very difficult to determine, as uncertain results do not pro-
vide objective measurement tools. Indeed, legal risk is increased in the case of powerful
and politically influential debtors. These economic costs promote a subjective and non-
transparent creditworthiness assessment over debtors. Risk managing has to introduce
a subjective judicial risk assessment that can make it inoperative. Without taking into
account such risk, capital adequacy requirements might be insufficient to measure the
soundness of the financial system, particular institutions, or even particular creditors.
76. World Bank programs and reports regarding Judicial Modernization in Ecuador are major
source of information and background.
77. DEEPAK LAL, supra note 50, at 33.
78. High inflation significantly affects economic remedies.
79. E.g., Financiera de los Andes, Banco Industrial y Comercial and Banco de Descuento, most
of them judged during the 1990s.
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The private financial institutions transfer these economic costs into the system, whether
as a generalized increase in interest rates, or as an unequal transference of losses to
society-in the case of a banking failure. On the other hand, these economic costs are
a burden difficult to overcome for public supervisors and regulators, in order to ensure
efficient defense of the public interest. As rules of public funds use hinder any kind
of direct bribery required by courts and judges, public lawyers confront a diminished
position with regard to private practitioners. Foreign courts or arbitration, as a more
efficient alternative dispute settlement tool, are restricted in the public sector also by
institutional weakness and lack of economic and technical resources.
Moral hazard costs refer directly to the behavior of the individuals, firms and public
entities in light of the non-existence of efficient enforcement of the rules of the game.
Debtors and creditors behaviors in routine financial transactions are less transparent
as legal uncertainty and inefficient enforcement of laws significantly encourage a non-
payment culture80 and boost the degree of tolerance in society for corrupt behaviors.
This problem is more significant for supervisors and regulators of the system as inef-
ficient and impractical litigation and defense tools have to be added to institutional
and political weakness. It is noteworthy that the absence of an agile and trustworthy
judiciary system can even boost financial fraud. The shareholders of a nearly collapsed
bank, encouraged by perception of little risk for financial frauds to be punished properly,
might find fraudulent means to rescue their equity and avoid absorbing losses before
depositors and other creditors."' Additionally, the gridlock problem formerly described
will create the ideal environment for systemic financial fraud.
Ecuador's Continental case provides an empirical example of this "judiciary" moral
hazard. A criminal judicial prosecution in Ecuador, opportunely impelled by banking
and monetary authorities against former managers and shareholders, shifted into a polit-
ically driven trial. Instead of determining the responsibility of private bankers, the judge
concentrated into the accuracy of the monetary policy 2 and the existence of cause for
the adoption of systemic prevention measures by the regulators. Solorzano, the Presi-
dent of "ie Supleli-e Cuut of Ecuador at te . . t ...... ; he accountability of the
economic and human resources used by the Central Bank to support the legal proce-
dures filed against former shareholders, rather than the fraudulent actions denounced by
the authorities in detailed reports introduced in the discovery. In 1997, imprisonment
orders were issued against former Superintendent of Banks' and Central Bank authori-
ties, together with some of the former shareholders and managers of the Bank. Although
the imprisonment orders and syndication of the authorities were removed a year later,
after a Judiciary reform, there was serious damage to the public confidence in the mon-
etary and banking authorities. A former manager of the bank and external auditors were
called for definitive judgment in the criminal procedure in Ecuador, but was restricted
to the grounds of public documents and balance sheet forging and double gearing. 3 In
this context the General Attorney's role conflicted with the other State officials. Rather
80. Defined as generalized society behavior to pay as little as possible (or not pay), or just to
delay compliance of duties. Delay is equivalent in inflationary environment.
81. Corbo and Fischer, supra note 31, at 15.
82. Continental was seized by Central Bank.
83. Decision does not consider most of CBE observations with regard to fraudulent disposition
of assets and mismanagement of liquidity credits granted by Central Bank.
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than supporting legal actions against the bankers, he suggested the imprisonment orders
for the authorities. Paradoxically, but explainable under the conception of factional, the
State prosecuted the State.
The Bahamian jurisdiction was selected by the Central Bank of Ecuador in 1996,
as an alternative forum to impel the impartial treatment of part of the financial fraud
and to get some economic remedies. The defendants expressly alleged the "laxity" of
the authorities and the gridlock problem (other Ecuadorian banks do the same) within
their major defense exceptions. Furthermore, the bankers initiated a libel action in the
Southern District of Florida alleging defamation and psychological stress caused by Cen-
tral Bank's public exposure of the case. Resolutions about the criminal case issued by
the Supreme Court of Justice in Ecuador, especially the imprisonment orders against
the authorities, were an important defensive means, further weakening and affecting the
credibility of the regulators. There are no definitive results in any of the cases to date.
Indeed the poor results of the more important recent banking case in Ecuador, may
have induced the moral hazard and gridlock problem referred to above and generated
the precedent for the 1999 banking crisis; as many analysts have observed. Effectively,
many of the 1999 failed banks cases have had similar characteristics with this precedent,
not only due to poor judiciary treatment, but also because there is a pattern of behavior
between the different failed banks. Connected lending, double gearing, poor provisions,
utilization of foreign jurisdictions and off-shore banking for fraudulent purposes, con-
formation of special purpose vehicles, etc. are also common.
The Continental case shows that supervisory laxity is not only a question of a lack
of administrative capability, but also a result of political interference, judicial inefficiency,
and corruption. Financial regulation is difficult to enforce, even with the willingness of
authorities and the existence of appropriate alternative litigation resources. Another prob-
lem that arose from judicial deficiencies in the Continental case, is the public officials'
extensive legal risk, addressed in next section, that might also affect efficient enforce-
ment of regulation and accountability. However, the more dramatic threat is definitely
the gridlock problem with its systemic risk implications. There is nothing as sensitive to
public confidence as a financial system. The effects of loss of confidence in a bank have
been duly studied in the context of bank runs and systemic risk. Sound banks can fail
solely for this reason. Legal uncertainty generated by an inefficient judiciary is a major
source of loss in confidence; judicial muddle can have important systemic resonance.
The evaluation of the relevance of the judiciary's problems in the financial crisis is
that there is a need to determine the next steps of any judicial reform in Ecuador, in
general, and, in particular, with respect to the financial system and its overhaul. Any
serious judiciary reform takes time, to adapt its instruments, institutions and practices,
and to ensure independence from political influence. Capacitating programs for judges
and other officials, and the introduction of technology in courts also requires reasonable
terms to produce any beneficial results. Thus, it is important to establish a temporary
regime to overcome the time mismatch, with politically independent bodies, which at
the same time will encourage the rest of the strengthening process and avoid the present
moral hazard and gridlock effect caused by diversion of justice.
Beyond a general strengthening program, there are also some particular conditions
related to the financial system. First, the independence of the judiciary from political
intervention or even economical bribery is essential. Economic interests in the financial
sector are very important, but so are the losses to the State and public. Second, the
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accountability of judges and recusal in cases of conflict of interests has to be monitored
carefully by a technical and impartial forum. Third, judiciary reform has to include the
General Prosecutor and Attorney, institutional frameworks, and other public entities that
provide judicial services or support for any case in the financial field.
An urgent introduction of financial task teams or financial courts, provided with
proper endorsement through political, institutional, economical, and technical support,
could be a useful mechanism for the general restructuring of the financial system.
4
Another temporary solution might be to entrust banks, and in general, public enti-
ties involved in the financial sector matters, with broad extra-judicial procedures for
the enforcing and executing of financial obligations. Indeed, to accomplish these main
objectives, it is necessary to implement an aggressive capacitating program over financial
systems, economic reform, and deregulation.
Financial innovation and, moreover, financial globalization raise another challenge
for judges. Innovation causes any judicial review to confront not only naturally existing
judicial deficiencies, but also scarce technical, economic, and human resources available
for these purposes in the country. Access to foreign jurisdictions, when possible, could
not only be a voluntary choice, but also the only means to enforce and especially execute
judgments. Deregulation also has facilitated international investments. For local investors,
the necessity for access to some international jurisdictions is another hidden cost and
risk, not necessarily transparent, at the time of the investment.8 5 How to evolve and gain
access to an international efficient judiciary system is the future question for financial
systems of emergent economies.
E. BALANCING PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGAL RISK
Disclosure and transparency are considered the main conditions to ensure efficiency
in a market-oriented economy. Transparency can be understood as a type of account-
ability. It ensures that market participants and investors are provided with accurate
information to assess their risk and costs, in order to make an efficient decision. Finan-
cial system regulators in Ecuador are public officials, thus such transparency is reached
through public accountability.
Public institutions and officials are capable of making and enforcing decisions that
may affect individuals, communities, and the general public. Evaluation of responsiveness
of a State is only possible through fitting and efficient accountability. Public account-
ability is the compulsory duty of a public institution or official, to give account, justify
or explain actions, decisions or omissions related to their public function. Accountabil-
ity also relies on direct actions or omissions of public officials accountable rather than
third-party actions. There are three major types of accountability: judicial review of
administrative resolutions, administrative accountability (for instance, regular presenta-
tion of reports to Congress), and general public accountability.8 6
84. Procedural law reform can be implemented for ongoing cases.
85. E.g., in Ecuador offshore investments related to Popular failure.
86. Dr. Rosa M. Lastra & Heba Shams, Accountability: Ex Ante or Scrutiny, ex Post or Control
and Transparency, Paper presented in London School of Economics Financial Market Group
Seminar, Rules, Incentives and Sanctions Enforcement in Financial Regulation, (May 26, 2000).
Fall 2001 609
Accountability implies an obligation to comply with certain standards in the exer-
cise of power or to achieve specific goals. However, the more complex the activity, the
more difficult it is to establish clear standards of conduct and specific outcomes. This is
the case for financial regulation. Financial regulators have to exercise their rule-making
powers and set policies in a way that is compatible with the regulatory objectives: finan-
cial stability and consumer protection. A good example of accountability difficulties
arises from banking bailout in order to contain systemic risk. Assessing justifications,
intentions, and costs can be subject to political considerations and multiple technical
interpretations as well. In the context of a factional state, interested interference consid-
erably increases personal and organizational risks and shuffles public accountability with
bankers and shareholders sole responsibilities and actions.
Ecuador during the 1999 financial crisis, and even before, had a chronic problem
of lack of public accountability. Problems arise from the difficulties in determining such
standards and goals in the context of overlapping and conflictive legal and institutional
arrangements, or from inaccurate and uncompleted banking-failure legal framework
that forced "legal-stretching" to cover several cases. Moreover, financial information is
addressed generally to specialized recipients, so partial disclosure without acceptable
interpretation could have also influenced a further lack of confidence in the system in
general. Last, but not least, judiciary inefficiency is another element that hinders confi-
dence in fitting outcomes as a result of public accountability and creates moral hazard.
Courts and the General Prosecutor's Office can provide a powerful tool for accountabil-
ity. However, one of their key characteristics is that they are essentially reactive to public
pressure, and in such a contentious setting, the necessity of objective public accountabil-
ity has been shuffled with politics. Poor accountability also boosts inefficient defense of
the interests of the State by public officials.
Personal legal-risk definitely can affect the efficiency of responsiveness. Omission of
responsiveness will result if the individual holder of the power considers that compliance
of the standards will have a personal, more damaging effect than such omission. Systemic
risk considerations and political implications overburden regulators and central bankers,
especially in the presence of an inefficient or bribed judiciary. Therefore officials have to
measure administrative decisions against the personal legal-risk involved. A supervisor
will refrain from reporting detection of irregularities if the personal burden of such a
decision does not have an acceptable legal umbrella of protection. Moreover, personal
legal-risk is increased in the context of a factional State, where the judiciary and other
public authorities can react adversely to the interests of the State, whether by bribery, or
just in accordance with particular economic interests of supporters of the government.
This element has a special relevance in Ecuador for financial regulators and supervisors,
including central bankers because bankers might finance political campaigns.8 7 Pervasive
effects of personal-legal risk are not restricted to Ecuador and have been felt by several
Latin American central bankers and supervisors."
In Chile, under general principles, all public officials have a right to be broadly
defended, in civil and criminal procedures that arise in the context of any public acts, by
87. E.g., Progreso.
88. See e.g., papers of CBE Seminar CEMLA (Center for Latin American Monetary Studies),
"Crisis Financiero y Riesgo Legal para la Banca Central" Quito, July 1997.
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their institutions for acts in compliance with a specific public function. To balance this
protective umbrella with private particular interests, Chilean public law also determined
that public institutions are accountable for damages caused to private individuals in the
exercise of their official duties. However, to ensure accountability, the institutions do have
a "right of repetition" against the public official, in the case of excesses in the exercise of
their functions.89 In Ecuador, the IMF has also confirmed the importance of the need for
legal-risk umbrella protection for efficient responsiveness of the State. The introduction
of an effective legal framework for this purpose has been included as performance criteria
for the recently approved 2000 Ecuador Letter of Intent. This legal-umbrella, together
with reasonable accountability, provides a better framework for institutions to perform
their activities efficiently and achieve their goals, and for individuals to do their duties
accurately.
The treatment of the Continental case, previously described, is a good example
of the legal risk incurred by central bankers, regulators, and supervisors. The DGA-
law introduced a special procedure restricted to criminal procedures against high-level
officials and related essentially to compliance of the overhauling procedures determined
in the DGA-Law. However, the protection was given by the requirement of a special
previous report issued by representatives of the National Banks Association, the DGA,
and the General Prosecution Office, which did not actually ensure any kind of real legal
protection.
A second and more general intent to introduce such kind of legal-umbrella came
more recently.9" It created Supreme and Superior Court special jurisdictions for high-
level officials and for managers, intervenors, receivers, and auditors of seized institutions.
However, it still concentrates on criminal cases and does not cover medium- and lower-
level officials. As a protection, it requires the previous confirmation of financial experts
qualified by the General Controller about the material existence of the criminal offenses
before filing any action against them. However, this rule is too restricted, as it does
not cover all the personal risk involved (specifically civil actions), all of the public staff
that can be involved, or other financial supervisors, for example, the Superintendence
of Companies and CBE. Because of these considerations, the umbrella may be mostly
ineffective. More effective might be the introduction of a Chilean-like scheme aimed at
personal litigation protection, without hindering public accountability.
Another source for lack of transparency and personal legal risk for central bankers,
regulators, and supervisors arises from broad banking secrecy rules. Management of
bank secrecy information generates another burden for regulators that can be used by
the regulated institutions to impose pressure and threats about its disclosure. Although
secrecy over banking liabilities can be justified in some circumstances, the grounds for
secrecy over asset accounts (banking reserve) determined in Ecuadorian Banking-Law
are not very clear. There are some jurisdictions where bank asset information is pub-
licly available and commercially distributed, which also can contribute to the further
transparency between market participants: it gives clear signs of the creditworthiness
89. Nancrur, M.A., (1997) "Responsabilidad Legal de los Consejeros del Banco Central Chileno
y del Superintendente de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras-Principios de Derecho Publico
Chileno," Off Print, CBE.
90. In March 2000, with Trolebus Law.
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of individuals and allows other participants to duly assess credit risk in their transac-
tions with financial debtors. Actual exceptions in Ecuador are too restricted to enhance
transparency and attenuate legal risk. They only provide for banking reserve and secrecy
release in the context of a judicial procedure.9" More recently, a particular release for
audit reports presented to few other public bodies provided the existence of previous
requirements and restrictions placed on certain institutions. It has to be highlighted that
no CBE information is comprised in these exceptions.
The extent of discretion entrusted to a public official or institution is a final factor
that can affect accountability. Objective accountability is feasible over non-discretional
acts, whereas discretional performance is difficult to standardize. Accountability over
discretionary powers can raise two main problems. First, the introduction of subjec-
tive elements for evaluation of the compliance of goals and performance, such as the
intention of an institution or an individual, contradicts the essential objectivity that
transparency requires. Second, it increases substantially the legal risk involved for the
official, as the subjective elements will depend on third-party assessment, by judges and
other accountees, rather than on duty, performance, and goal achievements. The prob-
lem is significant in the context of a complex technical field such as financial system
regulation and supervision.
In Ecuador, the veto-power of the Superintendent of Banks, discussed later, adds
another complex element for transparency and accountability in the field.
III. Financial System Regulation and Supervision: The
Administrative Capability of the State
Banks perform the key financial functions of allocating credit and operating the
clearing and payments system and foreign exchange market. Because of these diverse
functions, a sound banking sector is the single most essential element of a healthy finan-
cial system. Banking regulation and supervision has a significant role to ensure sound-
ness. This will require governments putting in place necessary infrastructure, in order
to support and limit the activities of institutions and individuals in the financial ser-
vice marketplace. Essential elements of financial infrastructure are laws and regulations,
accounting and auditing standards, transparency, disclosure, accountability, regulatory
compliance supervision, payments, clearing, and settlement systems.
92
Financial markets can misbehave anywhere, but emergent economies like Ecuador
are much more susceptible as result of the weak state capabilities formerly described.
Rodrik wisely observes that today's developed countries did not get their regulatory and
legal institutions overnight. "It would be nice if third-world countries could somehow
acquire first-world institutions, but the safe bet has to be that this will happen only
when there are no longer third-world countries. 93 The Ecuadorian financial crisis shows
how costly administrative weaknesses in institutions can be.
91. Indeed, implies judicial files overburden.
92. DEEPAK LAL, supra note 50, at 3.
93. Id. at 13.
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Laws and regulations ensure fair and equitable treatment of all players, be they
owners, managers, borrowers, depositors/creditors, etc. In order to generate public con-
fidence, the main asset of a financial system, the governmental role of financial supervi-
sion, should ensure that financial institutions operate within the rules of the game and
engage only in practices that are managed within reasonable tolerances of risk. Mar-
ket discipline, even with good public disclosure and transparency, indeed not precisely
characteristics of an emergent country, cannot substitute for such a role.
Probably the best period to assess the efficiency of regulators and supervisors is in
the aftermath of a systemic crisis. The organizational arrangements and legal framework
have been tested at maximum stress. However, immediate reactions to solve particular
cases, usually expressed by tightening regulations or amending the law, do not necessarily
contribute to improved institutional-administrative capability. In May 1999, legal amend-
ments with an impractical complete ban confronted the evidence of connected lending
abuses, thus creating new conditions for laxity or overriding. On the other hand, the
discipline that markets exert in the aftermath of crises can be excessive and arbitrary.
94
To rebuild market confidence is not an easy challenge. However structural-accountability,
an objective evaluation of the operation of the institutional framework, constitutes a
good starting point to achieve such a goal.
A. SUPERINTENDENCY OF BANKS AND SUPERINTENDENCY OF COMPANIES
Ecuador has divided the regulatory and supervisory powers and functions over
the financial system between two institutions. The Superintendency of Banks regu-
lates the banking and insurance businesses. Since 1993, the Superintendency of Com-
panies/Securities Commission has had the control and regulation of securities houses
and fund-companies administrators. 95 Institutional arrangements have to ensure com-
pliance of four major objectives of financial system regulation: systemic risk prevention,
prudential regulation enforcement, consumer protection, and prevention of fraud. The
importance of each of these objectives is connec"ed to die nature of the supervised busi-
ness. This dissertation is not oriented to discuss the general legal framework for financial
supervision. It is important to note, nonetheless, several restrictions that surfaced during
the crisis and hindered effective responsiveness.
There has been a blurring of the distinctions between different kinds of financial
services, businesses, banks, holding societies, investment firms, insurance companies,
and others. This has further added to the complexity of financial regulation. On the
other hand, financial conglomerates have become significant in this sector. The bulk of
domestic security houses and fund-companies have been closely related to the banking
system and, indeed, acted with little independence of their holdings. While these sub-
sidiaries have been important for financial innovation, 96 some have used this innovation
to defraud.
An additional problem is the operation of offshore-banks within a bank and, also,
other companies regulated by local and foreign non-financial supervisors. These firms
94. Id. at 22.
95. Separation inspired by U.S. 1933 Glass Steagal Act Model, reviewed in November 1999.
96. E.g., trusts and adaptive forms of "securitization."
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have taken advantage of limitations in coordination between the separate supervisory
bodies, domestic and foreign. Provisions introduced by the Trolebus Law recognized the
importance of properly coordinated and consolidated supervision over financial con-
glomerates. They tried to attenuate defects in information flows that arise with extended
bank secrecy rules. However, this did not overcome all the problems.
Domestically, in the context of a factional-state, the existence of separate institutions
might be the source of conflicts between different agencies. On the other hand, the
emergent Ecuadorian capital market and the lack of technical and human resources does
not justify keeping the responsibilities and powers in separate institutions, especially if
it does not ensure better quality of supervision. The great synergies between the roles of
prudential supervisors of different financial activities increase the need for them to co-
operate to improve understanding of the financial institutions they supervise and, hence,
improve the effectiveness of overall supervision. This increasing need for co-operation
and co-ordination may justify the establishment of a single prudential supervisor on the
grounds of effectiveness. 97
Single supervision is also seen as an appropriate response to the uneven quality
of supervision and consumer protection across the various financial sector's traditional
lines of business: banking, securities, and insurance. A fragmented regulatory structure
might generate inconsistencies in approach, insufficient communication, or an inade-
quate overview of regulated firms as more financial conglomerates emerge.
9 8
Cross-border supervision creates challenges difficult to overcome. Legal framework
is restricted to the domestic level, and there exists no such system as a formal supervisor
for international banking institutions. It thus requires effective coordination and har-
monization of regulatory and supervisory standards99 and flows of quality information
between regulators, and the introduction of other tools like lead regulator arrangements
and formal agreements between supervisors.
B. RESPONSIVENESS OF THE STATE TO BANKING FAILURE: RESTRICTIONS
ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
To provide adequate state capability to deal with individual banks, a legal framework
has to establish clear and transparent rules over four major fields. They are: lender of
last resort (LOLR) preventive measures, a clear treatment for institutions in the event of
definitive closure, and a deposit guarantee scheme. Finally, it requires accurate rules and
efficient tools and powers for intervention of the State in potential systemic closures.'00
These include balanced coordinating instances among the different governmental agen-
cies involved and transparency about allocation of public resources. This is significantly
97. Christian Hawkesby, The Institutional Structure of Financial Supervision: A Cost-Benefit
Approach. In REMARKS AT THE CONFERENCE OF RULES, INCENTIVES AND SANCTIONS:
ENFORCEMENT IN FINANCIAL REGULATION AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (May 26,
2000).
98. Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator, FINANCIAL
SERVICES AUTHORITY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, May 1999.
99. Indeed, implemented through national legislation.
100. The "too big to fail" principle.
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important for Ecuador, with a weak banking system which has confronted periodic eco-
nomic crisis that might decrease financial stability.
At the same time, an intervention of the State, and specifically the use of public
resources, require that the legal framework cope with three major criteria, in order to
ensure its optimal use.'
0
'
Those who benefited from risk taking in banking activities, namely former share-
holders and managers, should absorb public intervention costs in order to avoid an
"unethical" benefit. Establishing this as a precondition for any public intervention and
directly charging former shareholders' equity against the losses generated under their
administration accomplishes this task. Indeed, this needs clear and express legal pro-
visions to divide the public and private interests on the matter and avoid the risk of
counter-arguments or legal actions by former shareholders or managers that can weaken,
even neutralize, the intended positive effects of a public intervention. This ethical divi-
sion must be transparent in order for any banking overhaul program to bring discipline,
and to produce a sound and strong financial system, in the long term.'0 2 However,
this division is difficult to achieve as bankers significantly influence public opinion'
0 3
and also have considerable political influence.'O° To avoid gridlock, there also should
be proper accountability over previous corporate governance,' including the estab-
lishment of criminal offenses and civil damages. These respective preventive measures
should include severe restrictions on the operation of undercapitalized banks, with a
special focus on increases in high-risk credit or restructuring of defaulted loans, and
moratoriums on interest through fresh loans, taking advantage of public resources.
More important than the assignment of public funds might be the opportune inter-
vention of the State endowed by proper failure-instruments. This is relevant for banks,
because resource depletions can be overturned, for instance when there is an increase of
equity, or with the proper management of the risky assets that caused such depletion;
or can been further drained, in the event of a fraud.
However, both require major and costly political decisions (a) because politicians
are not aware that delay in government action only increases the fiscal and even political
and social costs"° of the final resolution of the crisis,'0 7 and (b) because the State
should also allow some banks to fail. This is important for market discipline,10 given the
existence of practical and efficient mechanisms to avoid systemic risk (e.g., LOLR, deposit
guarantee schemes, etc.). Finally, assessing the soundness of a particular institution is
101. De Ia Torre, (1997) quotes these criteria extracted from Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1996).
102. In Ecuador, e.g., complex "securetization and compensation procedures in the 1980s. These
non-transparent bailing-out procedures, in the middle of an undetected banking crisis, did
not show reality of financial system or supported opportunely necessary strengthening pro-
grams at the regulatory and corporate level.
103. E.g., ongoing concerns about communications control by former failed bankers, e.g. Filan-
banco and Progreso.
104.
105. Directors, managers, and even inferior officers.
106.
107. See RosA M. LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REGULATION 125 (1996). [Hereinafter
LASTRA BOOK].
108. Intervention timing relies on the technical and administrative responsiveness.
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difficult because there are significant technical difficulties at the time of the decision.'
0 9
Indeed, the decision should be made independently of the existence or suspicion of
fraud, which will enhance legal-risk. However, the practical impossibility at the time
of intervention to determine fraudulent conduct should be covered by the requirement
of proper accountability, suggested in the first criterion.
After the enactment of the banking-law in 1994, there have been several amend-
ments that affected banking restructuring in Ecuador. Analysis of legal framework to the
different fields requires some precise respect for its timing.
1. Financial Regulatory Function and the Lender of Last Resort:
The Central Bank of Ecuador and the Superintendency of Banks
Three main reasons are put forward to justify regulation of the financial system:
(a) to protect customers against monopolistic exploitation, (b) to protect smaller, less
informed investors or depositors and, (c) to ensure systemic stability. In the first two
cases, it is clear that the main interest of the regulators is consumer protection, which is
made through prudential regulation. Goodhart notes
[P]rudential and systemic regulation need to be distinguished, although both adopt a similar
approach. Systemic regulation is about the safety and soundness of financial institutions for
purely systemic reasons (i.e., because the social costs of the failure of an institution exceed
the private costs). On the other hand, prudential regulation is about the safety and soundness
of financial institutions vis-a-vis consumer protection, in that the consumer loses when an
institution fails, even if there are no systemic consequences.'11
Systemic regulation concentrates on potential runs from lack of confidence that even
solvent banks can suffer. A bank run might have contagion effects, which can throw
other solvent banks into insolvency. This risk justifies systemic regulation.
The probability that the failure of a single bank will induce a systemic problem may be low,
but, if systemic failure were to occur, it could be serious and the costs could be high. Thus
regulation to prevent systemic problems may be viewed as an insurance premium against a
low-probability occurrence."'
The low-occurrence probability and high costs mean that determination of systemic
risk might lack objective measurement. It will depend on the personal evaluation of
regulators. Illiquidity in a particular bank can be avoided with confidence recovery, pro-
vided opportune liquidity supply (through LOLR), and that professional and transparent
banking governance has appropriately managed risks. This is precisely the engaging point
between systemic and prudential regulation. Systemic regulation has been practically
administered by central banks mainly through the LOLR function. LOLR implies, among
other issues, that central banks should prevent temporarily illiquid, but solvent banks
109. See LASTA BooK, supra note 107, at 125.
110. Goodhart, supra note 73, at 5.
111. Id. at 9.
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from failing through short-term lending and make clear its readiness to lend freely to
the financial system. 1
2
While the regulations imposed for systemic and prudential reasons may be similar
(e.g., the establishment of capital requirements), they do not need to be (nor should they
be) conducted by the same agency. In the event of separate institutions, both will share
common concerns about financial system stability but their approach will be different:
systemic versus prudential; general macroeconomic concerns versus a strictly consumer
protection bias (microeconomic).
Although it is still most common for the central banks to also be banking super-
visors, over the last decade a number of countries have moved this function outside
the central bank.'13 Many scholars count several advantages and disadvantages of both
models but do not have definitive conclusions." 4 The recent developments in interna-
tional and financial markets have forced consolidated financial regulation (over banking,
securities, and insurance) in one supervisory body outside central banks."' In the spe-
cific case of developing countries, however, there are suggestions to keep the banking
supervision role as the central bank's responsibility. Lastra argues that the scarcity of
economists and financial analysts in most developing countries could justify having the
supervisory agency under the umbrella of the central bank." 6 The difficulties to create
efficient and politically independent governmental agencies and their huge costs also
confirm the rationale for consolidation of systemic and prudential capabilities in emer-
gent economies in central banks. Hawkebsky counts other factors in determining the
feasibility of the separate or single model of banking and systemic regulation. Among
them are the extent of activity by financial conglomerates and the size of the financial
sector, objectives of supervision, degree of independence of the central bank, technical
ability, eventuality of conflicts with monetary policy, and lastly, political considerations
like the degree of uncertainty that surrounds the economic costs and benefits of alterna-
tive regimes, which mainly depend on the recent history of the country in question." 7
Goodhart (1998) argues that if there have been recent problems in the banking industry,
for whatever reason, there may be a temptation for the government to make changes to
supervisory responsibilities.'"7 By doing this, they are seen by the public to be address-
ing the problem, regardless of whether the reform redresses any weakness there was in
112. See Rosa M. Lastra, Central Banks as Lenders of Last Resort: Lessons from the Asian Con-
tagion, in 7 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 234 (1999), [hereinafter
Lastra Article] (quoting Thornton and Bagehot).
113. For international practices see, e.g., Hawkesby, supra note 97.
114. See, e.g., LASTRA, supra note 107, at 148.
115. U.K. Financial Service Authority ongoing conformation has become a model. In this case,
Bank of England transferred bank supervisory functions and clearly kept the LOLR and the
systemic-regulation.
116. See LASTRA BOOK, supra note 107, at 149.
117. Whereas the separation model in South America was restricted to countries with Kemmerer
performance in the Pacific coast, British missions visiting the Atlantic coast (e.g. Argentina)
encouraged former "Bank of England" model, with supervisors just as a unit, thus ensuring
close coordination among monetary and financial policies.
117a.
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the old regime, and regardless of whether the old regime contributed to the original
problems.
In the 1920s, Kemmerer suggested establishing two separate institutions in
Ecuador." 7 The CBE was created in 1927, with stability of prices as a constitutional
main goal."' Until March 1999, monetary policy and the LOLR function have been
the CBE's major instruments to perform its constitutional functions. Meanwhile, the
SB is responsible for prudential regulation and consumer protection. This separation,
as noted, cannot evade strong boundaries between both institutions, thus the law has
established mechanisms to coordinate the separate model: the SB assists the CBE Direc-
tory sessions while the CBE Governor is a Banking Board member. The existence of this
separation model, by itself, might even weaken regulatory and supervisory capability in
the event that legal and institutional framework overlaps, distorts or even overrides the
separate functions. This might be the case in Ecuador.
Until March 2000, LOLR legal provisions were contained in articles twenty-four and
twenty-five of the Monetary Law.'nSb In order to be effective, LOLR has two operational
principles: LOLR's role is discretionary, not mandatory, and the central bank assesses
not only whether the situation is of illiquidity or insolvency, but also whether the failure
of an institution can trigger, by contagion, the failure of other institutions."' However,
in Ecuador, legally the SB was empowered with assessing the illiquidity or insolvency of
the borrower, as a previous requirement for the loan concession, so that discretion over
LOLR assistance was restrained extensively. CBE opposition to this external interference
could be considered irresponsible, if not illegal. Additionally, under banking-law provi-
sions, the lender does not have the availability to make any direct surveillance of the
resources, allocation, and borrowers performance, and has to rely on site supervision
made directly or indirectly through qualified external auditors, by the SB. Other prob-
lems arose from limited tools and legal instruments for the CBE to intervene in banking
overhaul and financial stability programs, in particular from the veto-power discussed
below.
This is despite the evident interactions and boundaries between LOLR/systemic regu-
lation and prudential supervision. Financial instability definitely threatened independent
monetary policy function. In other jurisdictions (the U.K., for instance), the law pro-
vides not only that central banks effectively intervene in financial policy, but also that
the financial regulators are accountable to the central bank for their actions."
1 9
The consequence of overlapping and overriding operations is the definite weakening
of both institutions. All this affects regulatory transparency and shuffles accountability.
In March 1999, the SB assessed Progreso for credits, but the CBE did not grant them
immediately within insistent requirement of further information.1 2°a Taking advantage of
the opportunity, Progreso publicly denounced CBE's illegal acts.1 2°b Progreso unilaterally
118a.
118b.
118. See Lastra Article, supra note 112.
119. Recently, the Superintendent of Banks intervened in the Central Bank in order to override
an administrative resolution of the CBE Board, despite a law that provides that he does not
have the right to vote in the Directory.
120a.
120b.
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suspended payments, moreover, without an immediate intervention of the supervisory
authority and seizure by the DGA, as the law expressly provided, thus boosting general-
ized concerns about the fairness of the regulators procedures. 120 Uncertainty around the
current banking system'21 and the surprise closure of the largest bank in the country trig-
gered a systemic problem that directly affected other institutions that were confronting
stability threats. Neither systemic risk prevention nor prudential supervision protected
consumers. The lack of public confidence in the institutional arrangements triggered
generalized financial panic.
The Trolebus Law and the Dollarization program in March 2000 have eliminated the
CBE's monetary policy capabilities and the old LOLR-function. 122 Additionally, a liquidity
fund, originally to be administered by the CBE, was also introduced.1 23" However, at the
time of concluding this dissertation, it had not yet been implemented, and there is still
discussion about the proper administrator of the fund.
A bill in the U.S. Congress, the International Monetary Stability Act of 1999,
designed to encourage emerging-market countries to use the dollar as their official
currency explicitly states that the United States would have no obligation to serve as a
lender of last resort to dollarized countries or to exercise supervision over their financial
institutions. 124 This confirms that, even in the context of Dollarization, efficiency with
regard to the LOLR-mechanism (whatever it is) and capable regulatory bodies are
still essential to ensure financial stability. On the other hand, CBE is still entrusted
with the management of the system of payments. Thus CBE systemic-risk prevention
responsibilities have not been removed. However, the Trolebus Law has not addressed
the complexities regarding the arrangements referred herein.
2. Preventive Measures
There should be sufficient preventive measures, rules and powers to address: defi-
ciencies in applicable capital adequacy standards, other corporate or administrative irreg-
ularities that can increase the failure risk of i financial institution, and the committing of
fraud. These should be of a non-discretional nature, to eliminate abuses by the authori-
ties, but also to give them unquestionable legal support to enforce decisions.
Prior banking statutes provided broad discretionary rules, including the appoint-
ment of intervenors.2 4' Deregulation was restricted to a minimum. SB was allowed to
impose restrictions on investments and new credits, but only in the case of inadequacy
of capital standards. Suspension of payments of a bank, until July 1996, was not even a
cause for the SB to intervene or for liquidation. 23 SB powers were given only through
the concession of short terms (ninety and thirty days) in order for the institutions to
properly adjust equity.
The creation of the restructuring-program by the DGA-Law, in December 1998,
reinserted some Banking Board discretion for preventive measures, but restricted it to
120. Formal intervention was delayed for almost three months.
121. Several banks already have failed and in early March, deposits were ordered frozen.
122. Dollarization implies CBE cannot issue domestic currency, so LOLR depends exclusively on
fiscal sources.
123a. See Trolebus Law.
123. Instead, the standard was a "clear insolvency warning."
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restructuring-program institutions. 124 In May 1999, another incomplete reform reinstated
the SB's capability to appoint broad-powered intervenors, albeit without improving the
general preventive-measures framework.
1'26a
The Trolebus Law (March 2000) has provided further and broader reform. -2 6b It
included discretionary measures and regularization programs to be exercised by the
authorities, in particular, a duty to intervene in any undercapitalized institution and, for
the first time, a valuable mechanism to temporarily control bank stakes until the bank
solves the problem. However, due to the range of discretion provided, it expands legal
risk for authorities, as treated in section II.E, and room for legal actions that might
neutralize the same measures.
3. The Deposit Guarantee Scheme
It is necessary to count with clear treatment for institutions in the event of definitive
closure, in order to ensure ordered and efficient liquidation, and even winding-up pro-
cedures. Until December 1998, the only mechanism supplied in the event of a failure was
closure followed by an administrative winding-up of the institution. Despite the 1994
bank reform's introduction of a creditors-board for its administration, the mechanism
had been kept controlled strictly by the SB, which appointed liquidation-administrators
and was even empowered to conform such creditor-board. Historically, liquidations have
generated long bureaucratic administrative procedures, which have not been accounted
publicly and transparently. Nor have cost-benefit analyses been applied to evaluate results.
The expectation of negative results from the closure of a bank has increased perma-
nently, the lack of confidence in the system. For example, in 1996, if Continental, the fifth
in the system at the time, had fallen, the opportunities to rebuild such public confidence
would have been limited in the scope of the regular liquidations. Therefore, to give some
comfort to customers and prevent the instability caused by mass withdrawal, a proper
deposit guarantee scheme is also required. This might take the form of a restricted state
guarantee for small savers, a priority for depositors over other creditors, or a deposit
insurance. 21 Its existence, at the same time, forces the improvement of regulation to
avoid pernicious moral hazard.
Over the course of Ecuador's history, all three forms have been adopted, either
independently, or in combinations. First, between 1994 and July 1998, there was a limited
small-savers priority over the rest of the depositors and other creditors, and up to 2000
UVC ' 6 were always paid in full. Then, a short-lived Deposits Guarantee scheme was
enacted in July 1998. This scheme was not even initially endowed by the financial system,
as was provided by the law. However, even if it had been duly financed, a longer period
(up to two years) was needed to fully capitalize the fund. Small savers were still protected
under the former priority scheme.
The lack of a proper deposit guarantee scheme probably upgraded the uncertainty
that already yielded the financially unstable environment of the last months of 1998. The
124.
126a.
126b. See Trolebus Law, supra note 123
125. See Ross Cranston, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 80 (1997).
126. A UVC is an accounting unit linked to inflation rates.
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consequences of the failure, closure and liquidation of another medium-sized institution,
Prestamos, in September 1998, might have induced urgency for the authorities to fill
the existing practical gaps. The result was the introduction of the DGA-Bill to Congress,
which originally considered a state-guarantee, which protected up to 3000 UVC and
restricted its application to a three-year period. The proposed guarantee was going to be
covered initially and immediately with public resources, in order to attenuate the social
impact of the forecasted systemic crisis. The State, through an independent agency, the
DGA, was going to be repaid in full with the efficient and effective disposal of assets
of the closed financial institution. The law, passed by the Congress in December 1998,
broke this theoretical framework and may have caused even further financial instability
and uncertainty.
First, Congress enacted an unlimited period and an unlimited amount for the state
to guarantee. In the context of insolvency, no unlimited guarantee scheme could be
properly financed, as the reason for such insolvency is precisely the existence of insuffi-
cient assets to cover all liabilities. Therefore, the losses (simply, the excesses of liabilities
over assets) were transferred to the guarantor, in this case, the State. Moreover, the
law introduced a central bank duty to discount fiscal bonds (the DGA-bonds) in order
to ensure the availability of public resources at anytime. The latter created a signifi-
cant distortion to constitutionally, recognized central bank independence, and forced the
monetary authority to provide unrestricted resources to cover the losses of the financial
system in the context of a systemic crisis. Most international and national analysts now
consider that this was the trigger for the inflation spiral and unstoppable exchange deval-
uation that was followed by the Dollarization. At the same time, after natural restrictions
imposed by the central bank, at first voluntarily, but ultimately under the stringent rules
of the Dollarization program, the absolute inefficiency of such a scheme to protect con-
sumers was proved. In March 2000, the Trolebus Law also moved back to the initial
proposal, albeit this will be possible only within specific terms.
A second unexpected change, introduced by Congress in the Bill, related to the
:nd pr1 e c .... e ". . . .k 'A to ef- ct-'_-_ -... .. _r .. . -I- .. r -., '. .
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board was amended, and the Superintendent was empowered with an unexplainable veto
power that surrendered the financing members to the banking regulatory authority.
127
The third unusual element was the restructuring-programs not included in the original
bill, to be discussed next.
4. Intervention of the State
Ecuador has not had mechanisms for intervention with public resources that ful-
fill the three above referrenced criteria, even before the bank reform of 1994. Until
August 1998, subordinated loans were the only possible mechanism to intervene with
public funds. This was the case in 1996, when the Central Bank intervened on behalf
of the State. In order to frame this intervention to meet the first criteria, the loan con-
ditioned the whole bank's stake to be transferred to a Trust, for two main purposes:
(a) to ensure the control of the bank by the State, and (b) to make certain that losses
caused by former management were going to be charged directly to shareholders, thus
not affecting public funds.
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This legal-stretched public intervention structure had several problems. First, the
loan and the trust agreement had to be negotiated forcedly with the administration
involved in the failure. The law at the time did not contain any provision for authorities
to take immediate control, nor even to impose an intervention (not even in the event
of the suspension of payments). The state was overburdened by obtaining a voluntary
agreement from the shareholders, in order to avoid the forecasted systemic risk. Sec-
ond, after the intervention, the central bank administration revealed that the equity was
negative at the time of the State's intervention. It was forced to conduct further inves-
tigations in order to prepare and initiate effective legal actions for remedies. Although
there was sufficient evidence of fraud for prosecution under the RICO Act of the United
States, Ecuadorian law did not provide sufficient instruments, neither civil nor criminal,
to impose proper penalties without repeating damage to the concerned companies.
129
a
Third, and probably the most damaging for the administrative capability of the State,
was the shuffling of responsibilities of former managers and shareholders with public
officials by the Supreme Court President in 19 9 6 .129b This promoted judicial interference
and conflicted with the technical and discretionary powers of these authorities. Fourth,
the bank cannot be properly overhauled if the subordinated lender is restricted in owning
the resulting stake.
12
The December 1998 DGA-Law introduced two new forms of intervention: the first,
contemplated in the original bill, was the overhaul-proceeding (saneamiento). 131 a The
second, introduced by the Congress was the restructuring-programs (restructurazion). 131b
In the first, the criterion regarding former shareholders assuming costs was met,
as the State could immediately control the stake, even canceling it if necessary. How-
ever, due to the distortions of the unlimited guarantee, there were no means to keep
inflationary controls in place (third criterion). There was an excessive concentration
of responsibilities over the Superintendent. More significant were the overlapping and
overriding caused by the veto-power. 129 Other major difficulties were the restrictions to
proper management of assets and the avoidance of banking closures, which deterred
rapid and effective responsiveness to redress public confidence and spare public funds.
The conditions of restructuring-programs have not varied, except for non-
compliance with first criterion: public funds were able to be invested, but former
managers and shareholders have kept their rights to them. This was applied in prac-
tice to only one case: Filanbanco 30 In May 1999, Congress removed public resource
allocation through restructuring programs. However, there were no major changes to
improve responsiveness in the case of failure, except the reposition of the intervenors
appointment. In July, another Bill was prepared to strengthen supervision and ensure
129a. See Racketeer Influence and Corruption Organization (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§1961-1968
(2000).
129b.
128. A special law in 1997 allowed CBE to keep this stake up to seven years.
131a.
13lb.
129. See next section.
130. In Filanbanco, however, the shareholders voluntary resigned their rights and consigned some
personal assets in order to cover the losses of the Bank. This case continued to be the subject
of public controversy and legal actions during June 2000.
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the existence of an independent agency and more effective instruments of intervention;
but it failed, and further legal-stretched interventions occurred over the next few days
(Previsora, Pacifico and Popular). These interventions were underpinned, again, on
a subordinated loan, with the only difference that it was possible to directly appoint
intervenors. Since March 2000, the Trolebus-Law has broadened the conditions related
to the subordinated loan and established clearer procedures to repeat damages from
connected companies and former shareholders. However, this evidently depends upon
the efficiency of the judiciary.
There are major problems derived from this legal-stretched state-intervention frame-
work. First, Ecuador shows several cases where delayed or weak intervention has allowed
former corporate governance to make an inadequate accounting of legal documents and
even to divert resources. Second, further legal risk is added, especially because there is
no clear dividing-line between the regulators and the bank managers. Third, without an
independent body to manage such state intervention, there is either lack of coordination
or overlapping of functions. The objectives of a public intervention, to prevent systemic
risk and regain public confidence are lost, if the rules are not clear. The conflicts that the
DGE-law aimed to avoid, were not only kept, but increased through the introduction
of three major changes: the unlimited guarantee, the restructuring-programs, and the
veto-power.
C. THE RELATIVE POWERS OF THE STATE VIS-A-VIs THE SUPERINTENDENT
The requirement of an individual favorable vote for the validity of a collective
decision-making process is deemed a veto-power. The Superintendent does have veto-
powers in both major collective-boards entrusted with financial regulation and over-
hauling: in the Banking-Board and in the DGA-Board. The effects of a veto-power
are the following: (a) it distorts democratization of collective decision-making vis-A-vis
the individual (other board members are only entitled to oppose), (b) it complicates
the decision-making process and sometimes renders the reaching of a decision impossi-
ble, and (c) impartiality is lost, as the veto-empowered personal opinion might deter a
free decision-making process.
Objective accountability and responsibility among board members is distorted, over-
burdened, and shuffled. It will be necessary to consider individual decisions to determine
the degree of responsibilities. A veto-empowered impartial negative vote might be seen
as an obstacle for a majority decision, instead of as a means to restrict personal respon-
sibility. On the other hand, veto-power implies that the majority cannot object to unfair
decisions, so that they might be accountable for the omission of the collective body.
The Ecuadorian framework offers a successful form of collective decision-making.
The CBE-Board decision-making process requires majorities, without any privilege for
any member. On the other hand, monetary law distinguishes policy-maker's' 3 ' from
executor's capabilities. 3 2 The executor does not have a vote in the CBE-Board, so the
board constitutes the real policymaker. This separation, on the other hand, ensures the
131. Entrusted to the CBE-Board.
132. Charged to the Governor and officials of the CBE.
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existence of an impartial and technical accountee, in the event of non-compliance of
specific policies by the executor.
Meanwhile, the SB policy-maker is a Five-Member Banking-Board, which includes
a veto-empowered and executor superintendent.133 Then the Banking-Board is not a real
independent policy-maker body, nor a proper accountee, because the veto-power turns
the Superintendent into judge of its own actions, in the context of routine financial
system supervision.
The situation in the DGA is more relevant: DGA was conceived as an independent
body provided with tools to efficiently manage financial instability. This requires coor-
dination of three different policymaking processes: monetary, fiscal, and financial. In
the first case, a system of payments might be affected by systemic risk, thus affecting
monetary programs. A banking crisis, on the other hand, forces use of public-funds or
its reorientation, in order to restore stability. Moreover, the unlimited DGA-guarantee
formerly discussed primarily depended on fiscal-sources. Finally, stability restoration
evidently requires special financial regulation and strengthening of the supervision capa-
bility.
The introduction of the veto-power submitted monetary and fiscal policies to the
actions and omissions of the Superintendent 34 and unfairly shuffles accountability
among all institutions involved. This also deters impartial accountability over financial
stability policies. Another practical effect is that in the event of a systemic crisis,
state-responsiveness is confined to a solely non-accountable official. In the context of
the factional-state, it is easier to control a single public official than multiple private
institutions and individuals.
IV. Conclusions
This essay has dealt with the recent, and to some extent ongoing, financial crisis in
Ecuador. It has analyzed the institutional underpinnings surrounding the crisis and has
examined the weakness in the country's financial system.
Two explanations of this crisis exist. The simple and superficial cause is a decade
of macroeconomic instability and the lack of economic reform. The second explana-
tion is more plausible. While the general poor condition of the economy during the
last decade cannot be ignored, the underlying origin of the crisis comes from struc-
tural weakness, not only in the financial system, but also in the interactions between
the political and economic forces that have prevented public confidence from build-
ing. These structural weaknesses and interactions are so powerful that they alone may
explain the poor macroeconomic results and financial instability Ecuador has experi-
enced recently. The ongoing Dollarization process is a recognition of the State's failure
to achieve politically independent monetary control due to interminable interference by
particular economic interests. The Brady default is also the result of a lack of structured
and long-term governmental policy choices that might have ensured reliable economic
growth and equitable wealth distribution.
133. This is nowadays shuffled, as Trolebus-Law entitled Superintendent with many discretional
policy-maker functions.
134. This also infringed upon the constitutionality of the central bank independence.
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Abuses in the allocation of credit are not new in Ecuadorian history however, their
effects have virulently surfaced in the context of an open and globalized competitive
international market. At the time of crisis, rather than having a private sector assuming
responsibilities about decision-making, further political pressures have been imposed in
order to socialize their losses at the expense of the whole society. In the context of the
economic reform in Ecuador, building capabilities and regulation enforcement cannot
be taken for granted. Governmental responses addressed by political considerations and
private interests have added complexities to the ongoing financial crisis, rather than
redressing existing conflicts and strengthening regulator capacities.
In order to ensure proper enforcement, financial regulator capability requires other
elements beyond just improving technical and economic resources, or successfully intro-
ducing international financial standards. Judiciary deficiencies on financial matters imply
huge, but hidden, moral and economic costs that might also be transferred to society.
Legal risk is increased in the context of a factional-state and extensive bank secrecy
rules. Institutional overlapping and overriding is another way to increase factional-state
deficiencies.
Complete and balanced accountability and disclosure of public and private actions is
the best way to back-feed legal framework, and to improve legitimacy and responsiveness
of the State in the financial system. Without transparency and fairness, it is not possible
to bring improvement to the ongoing structural anarchy.
